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ACCOMMODATION AND OPINION SHIFT
LEUNG ET AL.
CONFORMIST OPINION SHIFT AS AN 
ACCOMMODATION-MOTIVATED COGNITIVE 
EXPERIENCE IN STRONG AND WEAK SITUATIONS
Angela K.-y. Leung and Evelyn W. M. Au
Singapore Management University
Chi-yue Chiu
Nanyang Technological University and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
The authors introduce accommodation motivation as an individual dif-
ference construct that predicts personal preference to display conformist 
opinion shift, or the tendency to align opinion of the self with that of the 
group. The authors hypothesize that the relationship between accommo-
dation motivation and conformist opinion shift will be stronger when the 
situational press for conformity is weak. Having clarified the conceptual 
meaning of accommodation motivation, the authors present evidence from 
two experiments that accommodation-motivated individuals readily dis-
play conformist opinion shift in anticipation of discussing with disagreeing 
others when conformity demand is weak (vs. strong). The second experi-
ment offers initial support for a mediated interaction model: Accommoda-
tion-motivated individuals’ conformist opinion shift was attributable to the 
heightened experience of conflict-related emotions that ensued from mis-
alignment of personal and group opinions. The authors discuss the implica-
tions for measuring accommodation motivation as an individual difference 
in using group’s traits, values, and beliefs as the reference for the self.
Asch’s (1955) seminal article on opinions and social pressure has provided an 
identity-defining theme in social psychology: Conformity under group pressure is 
one of the most persuasive demonstrations of the power of the situation. The Asch 
(1955) experiments showed that at least some individuals would display conformist 
opinion shift; they shift their initial position in the direction of group opinion when 
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their initial position does not align with the group opinion. Inspired by this semi-
nal work, previous research has identified many individual difference variables 
that predict conformist opinion shift, including self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), 
public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), and collectivism (Tri-
andis, 1995). To extend this work, we introduce accommodation motivation as an 
individual difference construct that predicts individual variations in the tendency 
to align opinion of the self with that of the group.
Accommodation motivation refers to a personal preference to adopt group traits, 
values, and actions as references for one’s own traits, values, and actions, even in 
the absence of explicit external demands. In the present research, we hypothesize 
that accommodation motivation will predict conformist opinion shift when indi-
viduals expect to interact with disagreeing others during a group discussion. We 
further hypothesize the predictive relationship between accommodation motiva-
tion and conformist opinion shift to be stronger when the situational press for 
conformity is weak or absent (vs. strong). This latter hypothesis is based on the 
prior finding that personal preferences are more predictive of behaviors in situa-
tions where normative or appropriate behaviors are less clearly defined (i.e., weak 
situations; Mischel, 1973; Mischel & Staub, 1965). Because accommodation motiva-
tion reflects a personal preference to maintain consistency between personal and 
group characteristics, its effect on conformist opinion shift should also be more 
pronounced in the absence of strong situational press. In the following sections, 
we will flesh out our predictions and their unique contributions to the literature by 
elaborating on the nature of accommodation motivation.
THE NATURE OF ACCOMMODATION MOTIVATION
Many theories of conformist opinion shift have portrayed people as individuals 
who value autonomy and will resist any pressure to conform to counter-attitu-
dinal group opinion. Several individual differences (e.g., self-monitoring, public 
self-consciousness) that have been found to predict conformist opinion shift cap-
ture the motivation to display overt compliance without covert acceptance, treat-
ing conformist opinion shift as a phenomenon motivated either by the concern 
with one’s public image or by the pressure to fit in while keeping one’s private 
value or opinion intact (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Fischer, 2006). According to 
this view, individuals display conformist opinion shift because they want to fulfill 
positive normative expectations and avoid sanctions from the group.
Although conformist opinion shift often signals relinquishment of one’s au-
tonomy, some studies have shown that, at least in some sociocultural contexts, 
conformity to group expectations may occur in the absence of external pressure 
(Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). Furthermore, recent advances in neuroscience evidence 
show that even among Americans, attitudinal conformity can occur spontane-
ously and be experienced as being rewarding (Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011). 
Such neuroscience evidence resonates with the basic postulate of the social reality 
theory (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) that individuals may adopt group opinions as the 
reference opinions for the self. Hence, the perceived position of the group can have 
a stronger impact than personal opinions on social cognition (Zou et al., 2009). 
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These new theoretical and empirical developments raise the question of whether 
some individuals may have a strong preference to use the group’s traits, values, 
and beliefs as the reference traits, values, and beliefs for the self.
The self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1991) offers a more nuanced analy-
sis of the motivation behind conformist opinion shift. The theory uses the dimen-
sion of relative autonomy to differentiate four different types of extrinsic moti-
vations that could lead to conformist opinion shift. External regulation represents 
the least autonomous motivation; individuals engage in external regulation when 
they conform to group opinion because of external demand or possible reward. 
Introjected regulation represents an extrinsic motivation with a higher level of au-
tonomy, although introjected behaviors are still externally controlled. Individu-
als engage in introjected regulation when they are motivated to demonstrate the 
ability to maintain their social image; they regulate their behaviors to conform 
to group expectations without fully accepting the regulations as part of the self. 
Identification is an even more autonomous form of self-regulation. Individuals who 
engage in identified regulation accept group values and expectations as person-
ally important and align their opinions with the group norms. Integrated regulation 
represents the most autonomous kind of extrinsic motivation, which occurs when 
individuals incorporate group values into their personal value system.
Accommodation motivation refers to the personal preference to adopt group 
traits, values, and actions as references for one’s own traits, values, and actions, 
even in the absence of explicit external demands. As mentioned, there are several 
theoretical reasons for having a preference to align personal characteristics with 
those of the group. First, such personal preference may result from identification 
with group values and expectations (identified regulation) or integration of group 
values into one’s personal value system (integrated regulation), as the self-deter-
mination theory posits. Second, accommodation motivation could result from ac-
ceptance of group consensus as evidence about reality (Forgas & Williams, 2001; 
Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010). 
According to this definition of accommodation motivation, accommodation-
motivated individuals prefer to adjust their personal characteristics based on the 
concerns and preferences of others in the environment. To measure this motiva-
tion, we have developed an Accommodation Motivation Scale (AMS; see pretests 
of Study 1). In two experiments, we used the AMS to measure the relative strength 
of the participants’ accommodation motivation before they learned of how their 
opinions were similar to (or different from) those of their anticipated interaction 
partners. We hypothesize that participants with higher accommodation motiva-
tion, due to their preference to align personal qualities with group qualities, will 
be more likely to display conformist opinion shift. 
It is important to emphasize that accommodation-motivated individuals are 
aware of and feel uncomfortable about the discrepancy between their own opin-
ion and those of the group. That is, these individuals do not deny or minimize the 
existence of the inconsistency between personal and group opinions. However, 
they do not prefer such inconsistency, find it to be unpleasant, and are motivated 
to reduce it by aligning their personal opinion with that of the group. 
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ACCOMMODATION MOTIVATION AND  
CONFORMIST OPINION SHIFTS
We further hypothesize that accommodation motivation as an individual differ-
ence will predict conformist opinion shift when the situational press for confor-
mity is weak or absent. This idea resonates with the well-documented Person 
× Situation interaction in the study of personality psychology (Mischel, 1990; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995). To elaborate, in unstructured situations where normative 
expectations regarding what constitutes appropriate behaviors are unclear, per-
sonal preferences will account for a substantial amount of variance in behaviors 
(Mischel, 1973). Conversely, in structured situations with clear normative behav-
ioral expectations, the predictive power of personal preferences will be relatively 
small. In a classic study (Mischel & Staub, 1965), participants with differing levels 
of expectancies for success in ability domains (i.e., individual differences) received 
success, failure, or no feedback on their performance in a series of problems they 
completed (i.e., situation). Subsequently, they were offered a choice between a less 
preferred reward that was not contingent upon successful task performance and 
a more preferred reward that was contingent upon successful performance. In the 
FIGURE 1a. Overall moderation of conformity demands by general others-accommodation 
motivation on conformist opinion shift (Stage 1). Number represents unstandardized regression 
coefficient, *p < .05; Study 2.
FIGURE 1b. Moderation of conformity demands by general others-accommodation motivation 
on conflict-related emotions (Stage 2) and mediator effect of conflict-related emotions on 
conformist opinion shift (Stage 3). Numbers represent unstandardized regression coefficients, 
*p < .05, +p < .10; Study 2.
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strong situations where success or failure feedback was delivered, only the valence 
of the feedback affected participants’ choice. Participants who received “success” 
feedback tended to choose the more preferred performance-contingent reward 
and those who received “failure” feedback tended to choose the less preferred 
performance-unrelated reward. In the weak situation in which the participants 
received no performance feedback, only individual differences in the expectancies 
for success predicted reward choice. Those who expected success tended to choose 
the preferred performance-contingent reward, and those who expected failure 
tended to choose the less preferred performance-unrelated reward. In short, in 
strong situations, situational factors affected choice, whereas in weak situations, 
individual differences in success expectancies predicted choice. 
Accordingly, we contend that accommodation motivation as a personal pref-
erence to align personal characteristics with group characteristics will be more 
strongly related to conformist opinion shift when the situational demand for con-
formity is weak or absent (vs. strong). Specifically, when the task requires a group 
consensus to be reached among group members (i.e., a strong situation), the effect 
of preexisting individual differences in accommodation motivation on conformist 
opinion shift is expected to be small. Conversely, when the task merely requires 
discussing a social issue with the group members (i.e., a weak situation), indi-
vidual differences in accommodation motivation will be an important predictor of 
conformist opinion shift.
In summary, we hypothesize that in situations with low demands for conformi-
ty, accommodation-motivated individuals will experience more unpleasant emo-
tions and be more likely to display conformist opinion shift when they are exposed 
to (or expect themselves to be exposed to) a disagreeing majority. In contrast, in 
situations with strong conformity demands, individuals will exhibit opinion shift 
regardless of their levels of accommodation motivation.
OVERVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH
We conducted two studies that involved discussing a jury verdict case (Study 1) or 
a controversial social issue (Study 2) in a group setting. After the conceptual valid-
ity of the AMS was established in three pretests, in Study 1 we tested the hypoth-
esis that accommodation motivation predicts conformist opinion shift when the 
situational demand for conformity is low (Hypothesis 1). We extended Study 1 in 
Study 2 by demonstrating the interaction effect of accommodation motivation and 
situational demand for conformity on both conformist position shift and unpleas-
ant emotions evoked by anticipating interaction with disagreeing others. Specifi-
cally, as illustrated in Figure 1, following Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt’s (2005) ana-
lytic procedures for testing a mediated interaction model, we tested in Study 2 (a) 
whether the interaction of accommodation motivation and situational conformity 
demand on conformist opinion shift was significant (Figure 1a), and (b) whether 
the interaction described in (a) is mediated by unpleasant emotions evoked by 
anticipation of interaction with disagreeing others (Figure 1b). To elaborate, we 
sought to first show that there is an interaction of situational conformity demand 
and individuals’ accommodation motivation on conformist opinion shift (Hypoth-
esis 2; Stage 1): In situations where the demand for conformity is salient (when a 
consensus was required at the end of discussion; a strong situation), individuals 
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will readily conform to group opinion, regardless of their levels of accommoda-
tion motivation. However, in situations where the requirement for conformity is 
not salient (when only discussion is required; a weak situation), individuals with 
higher levels of accommodation motivation will more readily conform to group 
opinion. Next, we sought to establish that the unpleasant emotions elicited by the 
anticipation of interacting with disagreeing others mediates the aforementioned 
interaction by demonstrating that the expectation of discussing with disagreeing 
others under low conformity demand induces more unpleasant emotions for those 
with higher levels of accommodation motivation (Hypothesis 3; Stage 2), which in 
turn motivates conformist opinion shift (Hypothesis 4; Stage 3). 
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants. The participants were 89 undergraduates (39 males and 50 females; 
Mage = 22.09 years) from a university in Singapore, who participated in the study 
in exchange for monetary compensation.
Procedure. Participants took part in the study as groups of four under the cover 
of two separate studies. The “first study,” described as one about students’ per-
ceptions of interactions with significant others and general others, required the 
participants to fill out the AMS (see Measure section) and some filler tasks. After a 
5-minute break, the participants proceeded to the “second study” about jury deci-
sion making. The filler tasks and the break were included to prevent participants 
from connecting the allegedly unrelated first and second studies. Debriefing con-
firmed that no participants were aware of the purpose of the study.
We adapted the jury decision-making task originally developed by Kruglan-
ski, Webster, and Klem (1993) to measure conformist opinion shift. Participants 
received an information booklet that included the judge’s instructions and a sum-
mary describing an airplane crash that destroyed a lumber company’s timber. Par-
ticipants assumed the role of a juror and were asked to state their initial verdict 
on an 8-point scale (−4 = definitely guilty of negligence to +4 = definitely not guilty of 
negligence), with the midpoint (0) omitted to force the participants to make a guilty 
or not guilty verdict. Next, participants were asked to list two to three reasons to 
justify their verdict before they discussed the case with the other three jurors. 
All participants were told that they would discuss the case with other jurors after 
all the jurors had submitted their opinions. To manipulate discrepancy with group 
opinion, the experimenter handed out a juror verdict form that listed the partici-
pant’s own verdict and other jury members’ (predetermined) verdicts. Half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to the Agreement Condition; they learned 
from the verdict form that their position and those of the discussion partners were 
the same (e.g., if the participant’s initial position was “−4,” “−3,” “−2,” or “−1”, the 
other three jurors’ positions were “−3,” “−2,” “−3”). The remaining participants 
were assigned to the Disagreement Condition; they learned that their own posi-
tion was different from those of the discussion partners (e.g., if the participant’s 
initial position was “−4,” “−3,” “−2,” or “−1”, the other three jurors’ positions were 
“+3,” “+2,” “+3”). Participants then stated the position they expected to take dur-
ing the group discussion and completed a manipulation check item, rating the 
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extent of similarity between their own position and those of others on a 9-point 
scale (1 = not at all to 9 = very much). No discussion actually took place.
Measure. Sheena Iyengar and Carol Dweck (2001) developed an unpublished 
measure of lay beliefs about social influence. For the purpose of assessing the 
motivation to change the self to accommodate people in one’s environment, we 
used 15 relevant items from this measure to form the AMS. These 15 items as-
sess the individuals’ motivation to change the self to accommodate two targets in 
one’s micro-environment (i.e., parents and close friends) and three targets in one’s 
meso/macro-environment (i.e., people in the surrounding environment, those in 
the same institution they are a part of, and people in the same nation). Motiva-
tion to accommodate each of the five targets is measured with three items. For 
each target, respondents indicate the degree to which they would change their 
(a) traits, (b) values, and (c) actions based on the concerns and preferences of the 
target. Two sample items are “To what extent would you try to change your per-
sonal traits based on the concerns and preferences of your parents?” and “To what 
extent would you try to change your values and beliefs based on the concerns 
and preferences of the people in your environment?” Respondents answer with a 
9-point Likert scale, with 1 representing not at all and 9 extremely.
In three separate pretests, we examined the construct validity of the AMS. The 
first pretest was conducted with 172 undergraduates (64 males and 108 females; 
Mage = 18.74 years) who filled out the 15-item AMS in a study to receive course 
requirement credits in a psychology class. Factor analysis of the responses to the 
items showed that the AMS is composed of two factors: close others-accommodation 
and general others-accommodation. All items pertaining to parents and friends load-
ed onto the first factor (factor loadings > .63), and all items pertaining to people 
in the surrounding environment, institution, and nation loaded onto the second 
factor (factor loadings > .40). The reliabilities for close others- accommodation and 
general others-accommodation measures were high: the Cronbach α coefficient = 
.80 and .89, respectively. The two measures were moderately correlated (r = .55, p < 
.01). Consistent with the past finding that people are more likely to conform to the 
expectations of friends and families than to those of the general others (McKelvey 
& Kerr, 1988; Urberg, Degirmencioglu, & Pilgrim, 1997), participants were more 
willing to accommodate close others (M = 4.63, SD = 1.32) than general others (M 
= 3.34, SD = 1.38), t(172) = 13.23, p < .0001 (Table 1).
In the second pretest, a sample of 73 college students (34 males and 39 females; 
Mage = 20.53 years) completed a battery of individual difference measures that in-
cluded the AMS. To evaluate the construct validity of the AMS, we assessed its 
correlations with measures of other constructs: beliefs in individual autonomy (α 
= .84; Hong, 2002; 6 items; sample item: “In this society, what happens in an indi-
vidual’s life is of his or her own making”) and collective autonomy (α = .74; Hong, 
2002; 6 items; sample item: “In this society, social groups and organizations influ-
ence what happens in an individual’s life”); prioritization of own goals over the 
goals of the group (α = .70; Kashima et al., 1995; Yamaguchi, 1994; 21 items; sample 
item: “I respect decisions made by my group”); and extraversion (α = .87 for Gold-
berg’s, 1992, International Personality Item Pool [IPIP] Big Five factor markers, 
and α = .84 for John & Srivastava’s, 1999, Big Five Inventory). 
As expected, both close-others accommodation and general-others accommodation 
motivations had a positive correlation with the belief in the autonomy of an indi-
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vidual (rclose-others = .32, p = .01 and rgeneral-others = .26, p = .03). In contrast, neither motiva-
tion was correlated with the belief in the autonomy of the collective (rclose-others = .14, 
p = .26 and rgeneral-others = .04, p = .76). These findings are consistent with the construct 
meaning of accommodation motivation: Accommodation-motivated individuals 
tend to perceive themselves as autonomous agents and do not necessarily feel that 
the group has overpowering influence on the self. Also as expected, both accom-
modation motivations had a nonsignificant positive correlation with individuals’ 
tendency to privilege group (vs. personal) goals (rclose-others = .20, p = .09 and rgeneral-others 
= .21, p = .07). This result supports the conceptual distinction between accommo-
dation motivation and prioritization of group goals. Finally, measures of extraver-
sion (vs. introversion) did not correlate with close others-accommodation (r = −.06, 
p = .59 for Big Five Inventory; r = −.04, p = .71 for IPIP Big Five markers) or general 
others-accommodation (r = .16, p = .19; r = .10, p = .40, respectively), demonstrat-
ing that the AMS does not overlap with introversion, which has previously been 
shown to be associated with a greater likelihood of displaying conformist opinion 
shift (Matz, Hofstedt, & Wood, 2008). 
To further demonstrate that accommodation motivation is distinguishable from 
the need for affiliation, we carried out a third pretest with a sample of 90 college 
students (32 males and 57 females; 1 did not report gender; Mage = 21.69 years). 
Participants completed the AMS and a battery of individual difference scales mea-
suring (a) the extent of communal sharing (α = .79; Haslam & Fiske, 1999; 8 items; 
sample item: “Thinking about how you are with your significant other, if either of 
you needs something, the other gives it without expecting anything in return”), (b) 
secure attachment (α = .74; La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman, & Deci, 2000; 3 items; 
sample item: “When I am with my [name of a significant other], I feel a lot of close-
ness and intimacy”), (c) the need to belong (α = .83; Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schre-
indorfer, 2006; 10 items; sample item: “I want other people to accept me”). Finally, 
TABLE 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Extent to Which Participants Would 
Change Their Actions, Traits and Values in Accommodating to Their Environment, Pretest 1
Micro-Environment Meso- and Macro-Environment
Parents Actions 5.39 (1.82) People in the environment Actions 3.62 (1.78)
Traits 4.80 (1.89) Traits 3.27 (1.78)
Values 4.50 (1.92) Values 3.03 (1.80)
Mean 4.90 (1.57) Mean 3.31 (1.54)
Friends Actions 4.17 (1.91) Institution Actions 3.34 (1.85)
Traits 4.93 (1.83) Traits 3.15 (1.84)
Values 4.01 (1.94) Values 3.88 (2.03)
Mean 4.36 (1.65) Mean 3.46 (1.68)
Nation Actions 3.23 (1.89)
Traits 3.12 (1.82)
Values 3.43 (1.90)
Mean 3.26 (1.71)
Overall mean 4.63 (1.32) Overall mean 3.34 (1.38)
 
56 LEUNG ET AL.
to differentiate accommodation motivation from self-monitoring, we included in 
the battery of measures a measure of self-monitoring (α = .87; Lennox & Wolfe, 
1984; 13 items; sample item: “Once I know what the situation calls for, it’s easy for 
me to regulate my actions accordingly”). 
The results showed that the AMS is conceptually different from the other mea-
sured constructs. As expected, the need for belongingness was positively corre-
lated with the two accommodation motivations (rclose-others = .24, p = .03; rgeneral-others = 
.20, p = .05), suggesting that individuals with stronger accommodation motivation 
also have greater need for belongingness. The size of these correlations, however, 
was relatively small, indicating that accommodation motivation and the need for 
belongingness are distinct constructs. Neither close others- nor general others-ac-
commodation motivations correlated with communal sharing (r < .08) and secure 
attachment (r < .02). Self-monitoring was positively correlated with close others-
accommodation motivation (r = .21, p = .05), but not with general others-accom-
modation motivation (r = −.11, p = .32). This result is in line with the construct 
meaning of self-monitoring, which focuses on the tendency to actively adapt one’s 
public self to fit the current interpersonal situation rather than the expectations 
of the broader environment (Snyder, 1974). The nonsignificant or relatively small 
correlations between the two accommodation motivations and the other measured 
constructs in this pretest attest to the discriminant validity of the AMS.
In summary, the results from the three pretests showed that the AMS measures 
two correlated accommodation motivations: close others- and general others-ac-
commodation motivations. The evidence for the construct validity of the measure 
rules out the possibility that responses to the AMS are confounded with general-
ized passivity or response sets. The significant but relatively small correlations 
of the AMS with individual autonomy belief and the need for belongingness are 
consistent with the construct meaning of the AMS as a personal preference to align 
personal characteristics with group characteristics.
RESULTS
Because the current research concerned conformity to the opinions of strangers, 
only general others- (vs. close others-) accommodation motivation should predict 
conformist opinion shift. However, to demonstrate the unique predictive power 
of general others-accommodation, we measured both motivations in Study 1 (and 
Study 2). We reported in the text the analyses that included only general others-ac-
commodation motivation as the predictor, and those that included both accommo-
dation motivations as predictors in the footnotes. As an overview, in all analyses 
that included both accommodation motivations as predictors, only the predicted 
interactions involving general others-accommodation motivation were significant.
Manipulation Check. The group opinion manipulation was effective. Participants 
in the Agreement (vs. Disagreement) Condition rated their position on the case to 
be more similar with others’ positions, MAgreement = 7.48, SDAgreement = 1.39 vs. MDisagree-
ment = 1.73, SDDisagreement = 0.89; F(1, 87) = 542.19, p < .0001, ηp2 = .86. 
Conformist Opinion Shift. All opinion shifts were in the direction of the group 
opinion. Following Matz and Wood’s procedure (2005), we subtracted the initial 
position from the position at the second assessment and took the absolute differ-
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ence to form the dependent measure of conformist opinion shift, with a higher 
number representing a larger shift.
We performed a Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation (mean cen-
tered) General Linear Model (GLM) on conformist opinion shift.1 The main effect 
of General Others-Accommodation was not significant (F < 1.23, ns), but that of 
Group Opinion was. Those in the Disagreement Condition (M = 0.81, SD = 1.14) 
changed their position to a significantly greater extent than those in the Agreement 
Condition (M = 0.26, SD = 0.58), F(1, 82) = 8.09, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. As expected, this 
main effect was qualified by the Group Opinion × General Others-Accommoda-
tion interaction, F(1, 82) = 4.20, p = .04, ηp2 = .05. Simple slope analysis showed 
that when Accommodation Motivation was high (one standard deviation above 
the mean), anticipating a discussion with disagreeing (vs. agreeing) others was as-
sociated with a greater tendency to shift the initial position in the direction of the 
group opinion, F(1, 82) = 12.27, p = .001, ηp2 = .13 (Figure 2). However, when Ac-
commodation Motivation was low (i.e., one standard deviation below the mean), 
Group Opinion had no effect on conformist opinion change, F(1, 82) = 9.30, p = .59, 
ηp2 = .004. As an alternative way to interpret the interaction, when anticipating 
a discussion with disagreeing others, General-others Accommodation Motivation 
had a marginally positive association with conformist opinion shift, F(1, 41) = 2.93, 
p = .09, ηp2 = .07; r = .26. When anticipating a discussion with agreeing others, 
however, Accommodation Motivation and Conformist Opinion shift were not re-
lated, F(1, 41) = 1.13, p = .29, ηp2 = .03; r = −.16. In sum, Study 1 results supported 
the first hypothesis that general-others accommodation motivation predicts con-
formist opinion shift in the absence of strong situational demand for conformity. 
1. We also performed a GLM on conformist opinion shift by including Close Others-
Accommodation (mean centered) in the model. The Group Opinion × General Others-
Accommodation interaction remained significant, F(1, 80) = 4.38, p = .04, ηp2 = .05, and as expected, 
the Group Opinion × Close Others-Accommodation interaction was not significant, F < 0.09, ns. 
FIGURE 2. Simple slope of general others-accommodation motivation (one SD below or above 
the mean) predicting conformist opinion shift as a function of group opinion (agreement vs. 
disagreement); Study 1.
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STUDY 2
An important assumption we hold in the current research is that accommodation-
motivated individuals do not deny or minimize the inconsistency between per-
sonal and group opinions. Instead, because they do not prefer such inconsistency, 
they will experience greater psychological discomfort when they are aware of the 
inconsistency, and this state of psychological discomfort will be accompanied by a 
greater tendency to display conformist opinion shift. To evaluate this assumption, 
in the current study, we also measured the extent to which participants would 
experience unpleasant emotions after learning that their personal opinion was dif-
ferent from the group opinion. We expected a positive association between the 
strength of the accommodation motivation and the likelihood of experiencing 
unpleasant emotions when the participants recognized the discrepancy between 
personal and group opinions.
In addition, we manipulated situational demand for conformity by requiring 
half of the participants to reach consensus after discussion (i.e., high conformity 
demand) and the remaining participants to discuss their opinions only (i.e., low 
conformity demand). This manipulation would allow us to establish a theoreti-
cally relevant boundary condition of the effect of accommodation motivation. 
Specifically, we predicted that individuals with higher accommodation motivation 
would be more likely to display conformist opinion shift only when the conformi-
ty demand was low (vs. high). Finally, we extended the generalizability of Study 1 
by employing a different sample in Study 2 and using a different group discussion 
context. In Study 2, American participants were asked to indicate their personal 
opinions on several controversial social issues and anticipated a discussion on one 
issue with other participants. 
METHOD
Participants. Ninety-four White American undergraduates (49 males and 45 fe-
males; Mage = 19.16 years) participated in exchange for course requirement credit.
Procedure. Participants took part in the study in groups of four, under the cover 
of two separate studies. In the “first study,” participants filled out the AMS and 
some filler tasks. They were then given a 5-minute break before proceeding to the 
“second study” about their opinions on social issues. A probing question at the 
end of the study revealed that no participants identified the purpose of the study.
In the second study, we adapted and modified the procedures from the Matz 
and Wood’s (2005, Study 1) study. We first asked participants to use a 9-point scale 
(1 = strongly against and 9 = strongly in favor) to rate their attitudes on 10 social 
issues (i.e., capital punishment, liberalized abortion laws, sexual freedom, racial 
equality, government price controls, women’s liberation, religious education, gun 
control, a law to make flag burning illegal, and economic reform). 
Participants were told that upon completing the attitude survey, one social issue 
would be randomly chosen as a topic in a subsequent group discussion with the 
other three participants. When all participants had completed the attitude survey 
in their individual cubicles, the experimenter collected the surveys and excused 
himself for a few minutes to allegedly select a discussion topic randomly. When 
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alone, the experimenter chose the social issue on which each participant had the 
strongest opinion (i.e., with a rating of 1, 2, 8, or, 9 on the 9-point scale) to be the 
discussion topic for that participant.2 On the discussion form to be handed out to 
each participant, the experimenter wrote down the discussion topic and highlight-
ed the participant’s own position on that issue by circling his or her previously 
indicated attitude rating on the 9-point scale. 
To manipulate discrepancy with group opinion, the experimenter also indicated 
underneath the participant’s position the (predetermined) position of the other 
three participants on that topic in a manner similar to Study 1. At this point, the 
participants were randomly assigned to the Agreement or Disagreement Condi-
tion. In the Agreement Condition, if the participant held a position of 1 or 2 (8 or 
9) on the attitude scale, the other three members held a position of 1, 2, or 3 (7, 8, 
or 9) on the scale. In the Disagreement Condition, if the participant held a position 
of 1 or 2 (8 or 9) on the attitude scale, the other three members held a position of 7, 
8, or 9 (1, 2, or 3) on the scale. This manipulation served to inform the participants 
whether they were about to discuss an issue that they felt strongly about with 
group members who agreed or disagreed with their initial position.
To manipulate the amount of conformity pressure the participants would expe-
rience, we crossed the agreement manipulation with a conformity pressure manip-
ulation. In the low-pressure situation, the experimenter informed the participants 
that they were required to engage in a discussion on the selected topic (Discussion 
Only Condition). In the high-pressure situation, the experimenter told the par-
ticipants that they were required to reach consensus at the end of the discussion 
(Consensus Condition). 
Next, participants completed a final short survey before proceeding to the “dis-
cussion.” The first part of this survey included 10 manipulation check questions, 
some of which were adapted from Matz and Wood (2005). These questions asked 
participants to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely): 
(a) if they had the ability to persuade the group; (b) if the group had the ability 
to persuade them; (c) how likely they would try to understand other members’ 
points of view; (d) how likely they thought other group members would under-
stand their point of view; (e) if they would be under pressure to respond similarly 
to other group members; (f) if they would change their initial position on the issue 
based on other group members’ arguments; (g) if they would bolster their views 
in an attempt to persuade the group; (h) if they would counterargue in an attempt 
to persuade the group; (i) how motivated they thought the group members were 
to reach a consensus; and (j) how easy they thought it would be to reach a group 
consensus.
The second part of the short survey was an assessment of emotions that had 
been used to measure emotional responses in similar settings (Elliot & Devine, 
1994; Matz & Wood, 2005). The measure consisted of 24 items, each depicting a 
specific emotion (e.g., frustrated, optimistic, uneasy). The participants answered 
2. Sixty-nine out of 94 (73.4%) participants held the most extreme position (i.e., 1 or 9) on at least 
one social issue. When there was no 1 or 9 rating, the experimenter picked the topic with the next 
level of extremeness (i.e., 2 or 8). Except for four participants, all participants had at least one social 
issue with an attitude belonging to the extreme ends (1, 2, 8, or 9). The most extreme position of those 
four participants was 7 and its associated social issue was therefore chosen. When we conducted 
analyses excluding these four participants, results remained the same. When a participant had more 
than one social issue that was held with an extreme position, the experimenter randomly chose one to 
be the discussion topic.
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on a 7-point scale the extent to which the emotion reflected how they were feeling 
at that particular moment (1 = does not apply at all at this moment and 7 = applies 
very much at this moment). The next question asked the participants to indicate the 
position on the chosen issue they would take in the upcoming discussion. The last 
question was a probing question concerning the purpose of the study. No discus-
sion actually took place and participants were then fully debriefed and dismissed.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks. We checked if our manipulations of conformity pressure in 
the task (Discussion Only vs. Consensus) and group opinion (Agreement vs. Dis-
agreement) were successful. Participants in the Consensus (vs. Discussion Only) 
Condition should anticipate more mutual influence and a greater pressure toward 
yielding. Consistent with this expectation, a Group Task × Group Opinion analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) performed on each of the 10 manipulation check items 
revealed the following significant main effects of Group Task. Although partici-
pants in the Consensus (vs. Discussion Only) Condition reported a greater ability 
to persuade the group (MConsensus = 4.56, SDConsensus = 1.45 vs. MDiscussion = 3.90, SDDiscussion 
= 1.30), F(1, 89) = 4.86, p = .03, ηp2 = .05, they also expected the group to have a 
greater ability to persuade them (MConsensus = 4.24, SDConsensus = 1.24 vs. MDiscussion = 3.52, 
SDDiscussion = 1.48), F(1, 89) = 6.09, p = .02, ηp2 = .06. Participants in the Consensus 
(vs. Discussion Only) Condition also perceived that they would be more likely 
to change their initial position on the issue based on other members’ arguments 
(MConsensus = 3.98, SDConsensus = 1.54 vs. MDiscussion = 3.27, SDDiscussion = 1.66), F(1, 89) = 4.81, 
p = .03, ηp2 = .05, and expected consensus to be easier to achieve (MConsensus = 4.63, 
SDConsensus = 1.89 vs. MDiscussion = 3.69, SDDiscussion = 2.03), F(1, 89) = 6.49, p = .01, ηp2 = .07.
Results also supported the effectiveness of the Group Opinion manipulation. 
Specifically, the following main effects of Group Opinion were significant. Partici-
pants in the Agreement (vs. Disagreement) Condition expected consensus to be 
easier to achieve (MAgreement = 5.13, SDAgreement = 1.73 vs. MDisagreement = 2.80, SDDisagreement = 
1.57), F(1, 89) = 43.72, p < .0001, ηp2 = .33, and expected to understand other mem-
bers’ point of view better (MAgreement = 5.46, SDAgreement = .96 vs. MDisagreement = 3.90, SDDis-
agreement = 1.37), F(1, 89) = 38.17, p < .0001, ηp2 = .30. No other effects were significant. 
Analytic Strategy. To test our mediated interaction hypothesis, we conducted re-
gression analyses in three stages following the procedures proposed by Muller et 
al. (2005). In the first stage, we sought to establish that situational demand for con-
formity interacted with general others-accommodation motivation to significantly 
predict the dependent variable of conformist opinion shift. That is, we expected 
a significant Group Task × Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation 
interaction on conformist opinion shift. In the second stage, we tried to confirm 
that conformity demand alone or the interaction between conformity demand and 
accommodation motivation predicted the mediating variable of unpleasant emo-
tions. That is, there would be a significant Group Task × Group Opinion interac-
tion on unpleasant emotions and/or a significant Group Task × Group Opinion × 
General Others-Accommodation interaction on unpleasant emotions. In the final 
stage, we attempted to show that after controlling for the mediator and allowing 
the indirect effect via the mediator to be moderated (i.e., after entering the main 
effect of Unpleasant Emotions and the Unpleasant Emotions × General Others-Ac-
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commodation interaction into the model), the residual Group Task × Group Opin-
ion × General Others-Accommodation interaction on conformist opinion shift 
would be significantly attenuated, compared to the overall Group Task × Group 
Opinion × General Others-Accommodation interaction in Stage 1. Satisfaction of 
these three criteria would provide support for the proposed mediated interaction 
model: Unpleasant emotions mediate the interaction of accommodation motiva-
tion and situational conformity demand on conformist opinion shift.
Conformist Opinion Shift. As in Study 1, because all opinion shifts were in the 
direction of the group opinion, we took the absolute difference between the initial 
position and the position taken during the second assessment to form the depen-
dent measure of conformist opinion shift. We performed a Group Task (Consensus 
vs. Discussion Only) × Group Opinion (Agreement vs. Disagreement) × General 
Others-Accommodation (mean centered) GLM on conformist opinion shift.3  The 
main effect of General Others-Accommodation was not significant (F < 0.10, ns), 
but those for Group Task and Group Opinion were. Participants in the Consensus 
Condition (M = 1.03, SD = 1.60) changed their position to a greater extent than 
those in the Discussion Only Condition (M = 0.52, SD = 1.00), F(1, 82) = 7.77, p 
= .01, ηp2 = .09, and those in the Disagreement Condition (M = 1.35, SD = 1.67) 
exhibited more pronounced conformist opinion shift than those in the Agreement 
Condition (M = 0.24, SD = 0.56), F(1, 82) = 34.91, p < .0001, ηp2 = .30. Also, there was 
a significant Group Task × Group Opinion interaction, F(1, 82) = 8.30, p = .01, ηp2 
= .09. To interpret this interaction, follow-up analyses were conducted to compare 
the simple main effect of Group Task in the Agreement and the Disagreement Con-
ditions separately. Results revealed that in anticipation of interacting with agree-
ing others, participants in both the Consensus and Discussion Only Conditions 
did not exhibit significant conformist opinion shift (Consensus-Agreement Condi-
tion: M = 0.23, SD = 0.43; Discussion-Agreement Condition: M = 0.25, SD = 0.65), 
F(1, 46) = 2.53, p = .12, ηp2 = .05). In contrast, in anticipation of interacting with dis-
agreeing others, those in the Consensus-Disagreement Condition exhibited sizable 
conformist opinion shift (M = 2.13, SD = 1.96), which was more pronounced than 
that observed in the Discussion-Disagreement Condition (M = 0.83, SD = 1.24), 
F(1, 36) = 5.35, p = .03, ηp2 = .13.
More importantly, as expected, we found a significant Group Task × Group 
Opinion × General Others-Accommodation interaction, F(1, 82) = 9.42, p = .003, 
ηp2 = .10. Simple slope analyses showed that in the Discussion Only Condition, 
the Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation interaction was significant, 
F(1, 48) = 17.50, p < .0001, ηp2 = .27. Specifically, in the Discussion-Agreement Con-
dition, accommodation motivation was not associated with the likelihood of dis-
playing conformist opinion shift, F(1, 26) = 1.92, p = .18, ηp2 = .07. However, in 
the Discussion-Disagreement Condition, the motivation to accommodate general 
others was associated with a greater likelihood of displaying conformist opinion 
shift, F(1, 22) = 14.29, p = .001, ηp2 = .39; r = .63. As seen in the left panel of Figure 
3, significant conformist opinion shift occurred only when (a) the group opinion 
was discrepant with the participants’ initial attitude and (b) participants were mo-
3. As in Study 1, in another set of analysis, we also included Close Others-Accommodation (mean 
centered) and its interactions as predictors. The Group Task × Group Opinion × General Others-
Accommodation interaction remained significant, F(1, 78) = 4.64, p = .03, ηp2 = .06, but the Group Task 
× Group Opinion × Close Others-Accommodation interaction was not.
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tivated to accommodate general others. Replicating the finding of Study 1, this 
result shows that when situational pressure toward conformity is absent (as in 
the Discussion Only condition), individuals with stronger general others-accom-
modation motivation are more likely to change their initial attitude in the face of 
disagreeing others.
In contrast, in the Consensus Condition, only the main effect of Group Opinion 
was significant: More pronounced conformist opinion shift occurred in the Dis-
agreement Condition than in the Agreement Condition, F(1, 34) = 20.74, p < .0001, 
ηp2 = .38. Accommodation motivation was unrelated to the extent of conformist 
opinion shift in both the Agreement and Disagreement Conditions: F(1, 20) = 1.09, 
p = .31, ηp2 = .05, and F(1, 14) = 0.71, p = .42, ηp2 = .05, respectively. The right panel 
of Figure 3 shows that when the situation required reaching group consensus, re-
gardless of their motivation to accommodate to their social environment, partici-
pants exhibited conformist opinion shift.
As an alternative way to interpret the three-way interaction, we analyzed the 
Group Task × General Others-Accommodation interaction in the Agreement and 
the Disagreement Conditions separately. In the Agreement Condition, the main 
effects of Group Task (Discussion Only vs. Consensus) and Accommodation Moti-
vation as well as their interaction were all nonsignificant (F < 2.53, ns). In contrast, 
in the Disagreement Condition, the main effect of Group Task and its interaction 
effect with Accommodation Motivation were signfiicant: A greater extent of con-
formist opinion shift was recorded when the task required reaching a consensus 
on the issue (M = 2.13, SD = 1.96) than simply discussing the issue (M = 0.83, SD = 
1.24), F(1, 36) = 7.19, p = .01, ηp2 = .17. The interaction of Group Task and Accom-
modation Motivation was driven mainly by the effect of accommodation motiva-
tion in the Discussion Only Condition, F(1, 22) = 14.29, p = .001, ηp2 = .39: When 
there was a misalignment between personal and group opinions in the task that 
required discussion only, more accommodation-motivated participants displayed 
stronger conformist opinion shift (r = .63, p = .001). 
FIGURE 3. Simple slope of general others-accommodation motivation (one SD below or above 
the mean) predicting conformist opinion shift as a function of group task (discussion only vs. 
consensus) and group opinion (agreement vs. disagreement); Study 2.
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Taken together, extending the finding of Study 1 and supporting Hypothesis 2, 
the results show that individuals, regardless of their levels of general others-ac-
commodation motivation, showed significant conformist opinion shift in a strong 
situation where conformity demand was salient (i.e., Consensus Condition). How-
ever, only those with high accommodation motivation showed significant con-
formist opinion shift in a weak situation where conformity demand was not sa-
lient (i.e., Discussion Only Condition).
Unpleasant Emotions. We performed a principal component analysis on the 24 
emotion items. The scree plot clearly indicated a three-factor solution. A follow-up 
maximum-likelihood factor analysis with oblimin rotation showed that the first 
factor accounted for 34.9% of the total variance and had significant loadings (>.46) 
from 12 emotions related to negative self-evaluations: frustrated, annoyed, angry, 
disgusted, disappointed, regretful, bothered, negative, shamed, critical, guilty, and 
embarrassed. The second factor accounted for 13.7% of the total variance and had 
significant loadings (>.69) from six positive emotions: optimistic, content, good, 
happy, energetic, and friendly. The last factor accounted for 7.8% of the total vari-
ance and had significant loadings (>.57) from six conflict-related emotions: uneasy, 
uncomfortable, anxious, tense, concerned, and distressed. Similar factor analysis 
results have been reported in past research (Matz & Wood, 2005). We took the 
mean of the respective items to form three emotion indexes: negative self-eval-
uations (α = .89), positive emotions (α = .89), and conflict-related emotions (α = 
.84). Results showed that conflict-related emotions were positively correlated with 
negative self-evaluations (r = .58, p < .0001) and negatively with positive emotions 
(r = −.42, p < .0001); negative self-evaluations and positive emotions were nega-
tively correlated (r = −.34, p < .001). 
Past research has shown that awareness of conflicts in ideas between the self 
and others evokes the third cluster of emotions (Matz & Wood, 2005). In contrast, 
awareness of ideational conflicts is unlikely to evoke positive emotions or negative 
self-involved emotions. Thus, our analysis focused on the third cluster of emo-
tions, which are unpleasant emotions associated with conflicts.
We performed a Group Task (Consensus vs. Discussion Only) × Group Opinion 
(Agreement vs. Disagreement) × General Others-Accommodation (mean centered) 
GLM on conflict-related emotions.4  The main effect of General Others-Accommo-
dation was significant, F(1, 86) = 5.54, p = .02, ηp2 = .06: More accommodation-mo-
tivated participants were more likely to report conflict-related emotions (r = .34, p 
= .001). There was also a significant Group Task × General Others-Accommodation 
interaction, F(1, 86) = 9.25, p = .003, ηp2 = .10, which was qualified by the predicted 
Group Task × Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation interaction, F(1, 
86) = 5.80, p = .02, ηp2 = .06. 
We performed simple slope analysis to understand this three-way interaction. 
Results showed that in the Discussion Only Condition, the Group Opinion × Gen-
eral Others-Accommodation interaction approached significance, F(1, 48) = 3.77, 
p = .058, ηp2 = .07. The motivation to accommodate general others was positively 
associated with the magnitude of conflict-related emotions in the Disagreement 
4. After including Close Others-Accommodation (mean centered) and its interactions in the GLM, 
the Group Task × Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation interaction was marginally 
significant, F(1, 82) = 2.90, p = .09, ηp2 = .03.
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Condition, F(1, 22) = 29.73, p < .0001, ηp2 = .58; r = .76, but not in the Agreement 
Condition, F(1, 26) = 1.86, p = .19, ηp2 = .07. The results illustrated in the left pan-
el of Figure 4 are consistent with our third hypothesis. In the Discussion Only 
Condition, the more accommodation-motivated participants reported the most 
intense conflict-related emotions when the group opinion was inconsistent with 
their initial attitude. However, in the Consensus Condition, none of the predictors 
were significant (Fs < 2.34, ns). The right panel of Figure 4 shows that the levels of 
conflict-related emotions were the same across the Agreement and Disagreement 
Conditions and levels of Accommodation Motivation. 
To futher understand the nature of the three-way interaction, we examined the 
Group Task × General Others-Accommodation effects separately in the Agree-
ment and Disagreement Conditions. In the Agreement Condition, the main effects 
of Group Task (Discussion Only vs. Consensus) and Accommodation Motivation 
as well as their interaction were nonsignificant. In contrast, in the Disagreement 
Condition, the interaction of Group Task and Accommodation Motivation was 
significant, F(1, 37) = 14.54, p = .001, ηp2 = .28. This interaction was driven mainly 
by the effect of Accommodation Motivation in the Discussion Only Condition, 
F(1, 22) = 29.73, p < .0001, ηp2 = .58: When personal opinion was inconsistent with 
group opinion, if the task required discussing the issue only, more accommoda-
tion-motivated participants experienced more intense conflict-related emotions (r 
= .76, p < .001).
It should be emphasized that we measured emotions after administering the 
10-item manipulation check survey. Responding to the survey could have dilut-
ed the effect of our manipulations on emotions. This methodological limitation 
worked against our hypothesis. Despite this limitation, the findings supported the 
hypothesized three-way interaction of Group Task × Group Opinion × General 
Others-Accommodation on conflict-related emotions. Nevertheless, when confor-
mity pressure was prominent, participants in the Disagreement (vs. Agreement) 
Condition did not report more conflict-related emotions, although they displayed 
more conformist opinion shift. This unexpected result may arise from the dilution 
effect of measuring conflict-related emotions after administering the manipulation 
check survey.
Finally, no significant main or interaction effects of agreement, task, and ac-
commodation motivation were found for emotions associated with negative self-
evaluations (all Fs < 3.23, ns). The only significant effect on the positive emotions 
concerned the main effect of general others-accommodation, F(1, 86) = 6.79, p = .01, 
ηp2 = .07: Participants with a stronger motivation to accommodate general others 
reported fewer positive emotions (r = −.25, p = .02).
Testing the Mediated Interaction Model. Thus far, we had reported the hypothe-
sized three-way interactions of general others-accommodation motivation, con-
formity demand and group opinion on conformist opinion shift and the mediat-
ing variable of conflict-related emotions. The results fulfilled the first two criteria 
for the hypothesized mediated interaction model. Specifically, regression analyses 
confirmed an interaction of Group Task × Group Opinion × General Others-Ac-
commodation on conformist opinion shift, β = −1.19, SE = 0.39, t(82) = -3.07, p = 
.003, at Stage 1 of the analysis, and on conflict-related emotions, β = −0.88, SE = 
0.37, t(86) = −2.41, p = .02, at Stage 2. In the final stage, we added the main effect of 
Conflict-Related Emotions and the Conflict-Related Emotions × General Others-
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Accommodation interaction to the Stage 1 model to control for the effect of the 
mediator and to allow the indirect effect via the mediator to be moderated (see Fig-
ures 1a and 1b). Consistent with the mediated interaction model, the main effect 
of Conflict-Related Emotions on conformist opinion shift approached significance, 
β = 0.21, SE = 0.12, t(80) = 1.69, p = .09. Furthermore, the residual Group Task × 
Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation interaction on conformist opin-
ion shift became nonsignificant, β = −0.48, SE = 0.41, t(80) = −1.15, p = .25. In short, 
consistent with Hypothesis 4, which states that the experience of conflict-related 
emotions drives the effect of accommodation motivation on conformist opinion 
shift when conformity pressure is low,5  all three statistical criteria for the proposed 
mediated interaction model were satisfied (Muller et al., 2005). When conformity 
pressure is low, individuals with stronger general others-accommodation motiva-
tion conform to the opinion of disagreeing others more, presumably for the pur-
pose of reducing conflict-related emotions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Results from two studies supported the hypothesis that individuals with stronger 
accommodation motivation display more pronounced conformist opinion shift 
in response to (expected) interaction with the disagreeing majority. These results 
FIGURE 4. Simple slope of general others-accommodation motivation (one SD below or above 
the mean) predicting conflict-related emotions as a function of group task (discussion only vs. 
consensus) and group opinion (agreement vs. disagreement); Study 2.
5. Adding Close Others-Accommodation (mean centered) in the mediated interaction model 
did not change the results: The Group Task × Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation 
interaction was significant on conformist opinion shift, Stage 1: β = −0.995, SE = 0.46, t(78) = −2.15, 
p = .03, and marginally significant on conflict-related emotions, Stage 2: β = −0.69, SE = 0.41, t(78) 
= −1.70, p = .09. At Stage 3, the main effect of conflict-related emotions on conformist opinion shift 
approached significance, β = 0.23, SE = 0.12, t(75) = 1.86, p = .07. As expected, the residual Group Task 
× Group Opinion × General Others-Accommodation interaction on conformist opinion shift was 
nonsignificant, β = −0.20, SE = 0.44, t(75) = −0.47, p = .64. 
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have important implications for understanding the nature of accommodation mo-
tivation.
NATURE OF ACCOMMODATION MOTIVATION
Regarding the nature of accommodation motivation, our results provide prelimi-
nary support that it is a self-initiated motivation: Accommodation-motivated indi-
viduals are individuals who would change their traits, values, and actions based 
on the concerns and preferences of others in their environment. Therefore, accom-
modating others might not be in conflict with their sense of personal autonomy. As 
the pretests revealed, accommodation motivation is positively correlated with the 
belief in individual autonomy. 
Furthermore, in both Studies 1 and 2, we measured accommodation motivation 
as an individual difference before participants learned of the upcoming discussion 
and the group opinion. In addition, after learning about the upcoming discussion, 
accommodation-driven individuals readjusted their position to match the group’s 
position. It is important to note that this realignment occurred before they engaged 
in the group discussion. That is, their conformist opinion shift was not induced 
by the persuasion from the group during the discussion, but from a self-initiated 
plan to accommodate. This contention is consistent with the finding from a recent 
fMRI study (Zaki et al., 2011), which showed that behavioral conformity to group 
opinions engages two brain regions (the nucleus accumbens and the orbitofrontal 
cortex) associated with computation of subjective values. This neurological evi-
dence suggests that individuals may privately accept the opinions of the group 
after having been exposed to social norms.
On a related note, neither close others- accommodations nor general others-
accommodations predict the self-perceived ability to persuade others to change 
their positions. For example, neither close others- accommodations nor general 
others-accommodations correlated significantly with participants’ perceived abil-
ity to persuade the group (for Study 1: rclose-others = .10, p = .37 and rgeneral-others = .08, 
p = .43; for Study 2: rclose-others = .06, p = .59 and rgeneral-others = .01, p = .93). That is, 
accommodation-motivated individuals do not feel that they are less able to influ-
ence others; rather, they prefer consistency between personal and group opinions 
and adopt the group opinions as references for their own. Although our findings 
are consistent with the idea that accommodation motivation reflects a personal 
preference, future research is needed to further confirm that the accommodation 
motivation, as it is measured in the current research, does not reflect individuals’ 
inclination to yield to perceived external pressure. For example, when responding 
to an AMS question such as “To what extent would you try to change your per-
sonal traits based on the concerns and preferences of your parents?” respondents 
might consider the pressure to accommodate from their parents. Thus, future re-
search is needed to provide further evidence for accommodation motivation as a 
personal preference.
Another notable finding is that accommodation motivation is relationship-spe-
cific. The first pretest showed that the willingness to accommodate close others is 
only moderately correlated with the willingness to accommodate general others. 
As shown in the two main studies, only general others-accommodation consis-
tently predicts conformist opinion shift in interaction with strangers in one’s en-
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vironment. Therefore, it seems plausible that relationship-specific accommodation 
motivation predicts yielding in different influence situations. However, this find-
ing does not imply that close others-accommodation motivation is irrelevant to 
conformist opinion shift. In the present research, because we measured conformist 
opinion shift resulting from awareness of disagreement with strangers, only gen-
eral others-accommodation predicted conformist opinion shift. It is possible that 
close others-accommodation motivation also predicts conformist opinion shift re-
sulting from awareness of disagreement with people in one’s ingroup (e.g., par-
ents, close friends). This possibility merits future investigation. 
CONNECTION TO GROUP-LEVEL COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
Individuals with differing strength of the accommodation motivation differ mark-
edly in their responses to discrepancy between personal and group opinions. In-
dividuals with weaker accommodation motivation are not emotionally affected 
by whether their opinion and the group opinion are in agreement. Nonetheless, 
they strategically shift their opinion in the direction of the group opinion, but only 
when the situational demand for conformity is high. 
In contrast, individuals with stronger accommodation motivation experience 
conflicts when their personal opinion is different from that of the group. The con-
flict may arise from the discrepancy between reality (misalignment of personal 
and group opinions) and what these individuals prefer (alignment of personal 
and group opinions). The conflict experienced by accommodation-motivated in-
dividuals is more intense when the situational demand for conformity is low than 
when it is high, probably because the strong situation creates the expectation that 
the group will reach a consensus after discussion and hence the discrepancy will 
eventually disappear.
The cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1958) has provided an influen-
tial perspective for explaining conformist opinion shift. According to this theory, 
when people recognize that their personal opinion is different from group con-
sensus, they experience psychological discomfort (Abelson et al., 1968; Festinger, 
1957). To reduce such discomfort, individuals change their opinions to restore 
cognitive consistency (Aronson, 1969; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Matz & Wood, 2005). 
In this connection, past research has shown that when individuals are exposed 
to disagreeing others, they experience group-level cognitive dissonance (Matz & 
Wood, 2005), which can be reduced by conformist opinion shift (Matz & Wood, 
2005; Study 3). Previous findings have shown that people are particularly likely to 
experience cognitive dissonance when they act counterattitudinally in weak situ-
ations or in situations in which people have the freedom to act (Cooper & Fazio, 
1984; Festinger, 1957; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). This is because in the pres-
ence of strong situational demands, the individual can attribute his or her attitude-
incongruent behaviors to external pressure. Finally, there is evidence that some in-
dividuals (e.g., introverts) are particularly likely to experience negative emotions 
and display conformist opinion shift when they are exposed to disagreeing others 
(Matz et al., 2008). 
The many parallels between the accommodation motivation effect and the 
group-level cognitive dissonance effect suggest that accommodation motivation 
could be the motivation underlying the evocation of group-level cognitive dis-
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sonance. Specifically, based on past research, individuals are expected to experi-
ence group-level cognitive dissonance when they have registered the discrepancy 
between personal and group opinions in weak situations. Our results show that 
individuals with stronger accommodation motivation experience intense attitu-
dinal conflicts and exhibit more pronounced conformist opinion shift when they 
recognize that their opinion is different from the group opinion, particularly when 
these individuals are in a weak situation where they are not required to agree 
with the group. The parallels are striking. Furthermore, the measure of conflict-
related emotions used in the present research was also used to measure cognitive 
dissonance-related emotions. Thus, a promising direction for future research is to 
directly examine the role of accommodation motivation in group-level cognitive 
dissonance (Matz & Wood, 2005). Such research might shed light on the motiva-
tional foundation of group-level cognitive dissonance as well as on the source of 
individual differences in the susceptibility to the group-level cognitive dissonance 
effect.
Despite the striking similarity between the phenomena associated with accom-
modation motivation and those associated with group-level cognitive dissonance, 
a nuanced difference merits attention. The group-level cognitive dissonance the-
ory attributes conformist opinion shift and felt conflicts to the perceived inconsis-
tency between individual and group opinions. The accommodation motivation 
account attributes conformity shift and felt conflicts to the perceived inconsistency 
between the preferred state and actual level of attitudinal consistency. That is, ac-
commodation-motivated individuals prefer consistency between individual and 
group opinions. When they find out that their personal opinion is different from 
the group opinion, they feel conflicted because reality differs from what they pre-
fer. From this perspective, the accommodation motivation effect is not merely an 
effect of cognitive dissonance but also one of self-discrepancy. 
CONCLUSION
As a classical phenomenon in social psychology, conformist opinion shift illus-
trates how groups can influence attitudes. Current theories of conformist opinion 
shift tend to view it as one that is motivated by instrumental factors (rewards as-
sociated with conformity and sanctions associated with deviance) and the desire 
to minimize psychological conflict. Recent cross-cultural research suggests that 
in Asian cultural contexts, individuals willingly defer to the group when making 
decisions (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). Neuroscience evidence also suggests that even 
among Americans, attitudinal conformity can occur spontaneously and be expe-
rienced as being rewarding (Zaki et al., 2011). This raises the question of whether 
some individuals may have a strong preference for using the group’s traits, val-
ues, and beliefs as the reference traits, values, and beliefs for the self. This idea is 
compelling in light of the recent advances in understanding normative influence 
on social cognition (Zou et al., 2009) through the theoretical lens of the shared 
reality theory (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). To address this issue, we constructed a 
measure of accommodation motivation to capture individual differences in the 
personal preference for aligning personal characteristics with group characteris-
tics. In two studies, we showed that among individuals with higher accommoda-
tion motivation, awareness of discrepancy between personal and group opinions 
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evoked more intense conflict-related emotions, which were accompanied by more 
conformist opinion shifts. This finding suggests that accommodation motivation 
could be a personal preference, although individuals and groups may differ in the 
strength of this motivation. We encourage future research to uncover the anteced-
ents of this motivation as well as its consequences on group cognitions, emotions, 
and behaviors.
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